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Abstract 
 
There is a great deal of evidence supporting the idea that, when a stimulus is processed fluently, it 
is more likely to be judged as pleasant. However, this influence of fluency on preference 
judgement seems to depend on several experimental conditions. So we tried to better understand 
these conditions via a comparison with recognition and by manipulating some aspects of the 
procedure (test format) and material (similarity and figure-ground contrast of the stimuli). Two 
experiments showed that some conditions maximally induce the use of processing fluency in a 
preference judgement, as in a recognition task. We discuss the implications of these findings for 
the well-documented discrepancy-attribution hypothesis (Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000). 
 
Key words: Mere exposure effect, Familiarity, Recognition, Stimulus similarity, Fluency, 
Expectations
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Prior work has demonstrated experimentally that various manipulations that enhance the 
experience of perceptual fluency (such as varying the visual clarity of test items) or conceptual 
fluency (such as varying the predictive level of conceptual context) influence how subjects 
respond on recognition memory tests. Stimuli that are perceived fluently relative to other stimuli 
presented in the same context are more likely to be judged as familiar, and thus as old, in a 
recognition task (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000; Whittlesea, 1993; 
Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990). The same is true of other judgements or experiences, like 
judgements of preference (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992, 1994; Reber, Winkielman, & 
Schwarz, 1998; Seamon et al., 1983a; Whittlesea & Price, 2001), truth (Reber & Schwarz, 1999), 
fame (Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989), perceptual characteristics (Goldinger, Kleider, & 
Shelley, 1998), frequency estimates (Reber & Zupanek, 2002; Wanke, Schwarz, & Bless, 1995), 
feelings of knowing (Koriat, 2000), stimulus duration (Masson & Caldwell, 1998), etc. To take 
the case of preference, there is a great deal of evidence supporting the idea that, when a stimulus 
is fluently processed, it is more likely to be judged as pleasant or preferred than less fluently 
processed stimuli (see Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004). To date, the most extensively 
studied phenomenon has been the mere exposure effect, defined as an enhanced positive attitude 
towards a stimulus that has been processed earlier (Zajonc, 1968; for review, see Butler & Berry, 
2004).  
Whereas the precise nature of the relationship between processing fluency and recognition 
memory has been extensively investigated, this is not yet true of other judgemental tasks. In this 
study, we tried to better understand the conditions in which fluency has an impact on preference 
decisions via a comparison with recognition. More specifically, as regards recognition, the degree 
to which fluency plays a role in recognition decisions depends on several factors. The question 
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that is addressed in this study is whether similar factors might mediate the influence of fluency on 
preference judgements. We first describe the factors that mediate the influence of fluency on 
recognition. Then we will address what is known about preference judgements. 
The dual-process models of recognition memory (e.g., Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Jacoby & 
Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980; Tulving, 1985; see Yonelinas, 2002, for a recent review) assume 
that the recognition of prior events may use two separate processes: recollection (retrieval of 
contextual detail) and familiarity. According to the fluency account, conceptual or perceptual 
fluency can mediate successful familiarity-driven recognition (e.g., Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram & 
Geraci, 2000; Willems & Van der Linden, in press). However, there may be some circumstances 
in which people do not use fluency for recognition decisions. Firstly, some types of condition 
may encourage reliance on other processes than the perception of enhanced fluency. In fact, 
fluency-based recognition responses certainly correspond to feelings of intuiting, when 
recollection can seem be a more definitive basis for responding (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Thus, a 
recollection-based strategy will generally be chosen over a fluency-based strategy when 
distinctive cues are available or elaborative processing at the time of encoding is permitted. 
Secondly, sometimes fluency is not interpreted as a sign that the stimulus has been encountered 
in the past. Indeed, another element determining the role of fluency in recognition (e.g., 
Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000, 2001a, b) consists of indirect factors such as the attributions 
and expectations developed by the participants. In this context, Whittlesea and Williams have 
proposed a discrepancy-attribution hypothesis, which states that enhanced fluency is 
unconsciously attributed to previous exposure to a stimulus and creates a feeling of familiarity, 
only when the individual is surprised by the ease with which he or she is able to process the item. 
In other words, familiarity is experienced when there is a discrepancy between the expected and 
the actual fluency of processing. Thus, Whittlesea and Williams suggest that it is not fluency per 
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se that produces the feeling of familiarity, but rather the fact that the fluent processing occurs 
under unexpected circumstances. By contrast, when the source of fluency is more salient (e.g., 
seeing a picture that is much clearer than other pictures), the subject may formulate expectations 
regarding the fluency with which the stimulus should be processed, and this reduces the 
likelihood that fluency will serve as the basis of familiarity-based memory decisions.  
 Today the role of fluency in preference judgements is much less clear. A first problem 
with this relationship is that it does not seem to be direct and proportional (in the sense that low 
processing fluency leads to a small increase in preference whereas high processing fluency is 
reflected in a strong preference for a stimulus). For example, it has been shown that fluency due 
to previous exposure has the strongest influence on preference when the stimuli were previously 
presented for relatively short durations (see Bornstein, 1989) with low pre-exposure frequency 
(e.g., Van den Bergh & Vrana, 1998), or when the stimuli used are complex (Bornstein, Kale, & 
Cornell, 1990; Cox & Cox, 1988, 2002). In view of these observations, one interesting approach 
may be that, as with recognition, the enhanced influence of fluency is not systematic. Rather, the 
degree to which fluency plays a role in preference may depend on factors quite similar to the ones 
described above (i.e., the availability of other information and the role of expectations and 
attributions). First, it has been demonstrated that people rely on a variety of cues when making 
preference judgements. An interesting illustration of the diversity of the cues that may underlie 
such judgements is provided by studies of facial attractiveness. Indeed, numerous characteristics 
of shape (e.g., averageness, Langlois & Roggman, 1990; Rhodes, Sumich, & Byatt, 1999; 
prototypical facial proportions, Rhodes, Hickford, & Jeffery, 2000; and symmetry, Jones, Little, 
& Perrett, 2003) and some surface characteristics (e.g., skin texture and coloration, apparent 
health of skin, Jones, Little, Burt, & Perrett, 2004; Penton-Voak & Perrett, 2001) seem to 
influence subjects’ liking of unfamiliar faces. Given the abundance of informative inputs for 
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preference judgements, it seems obvious that the fluency effect may be limited by the fact that 
subjects can also rely on available and relevant cues other than fluency for their judgement. In 
agreement with this assumption, it should be noted that the fluency effect has been found to have 
the strongest influence when the stimuli are unfamiliar, neutral or presented for relatively short 
durations (see Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). Besides, the effect of 
repetition on preference decisions (i.e., mere exposure effect) has most often been investigated, 
on one hand, by using unfamiliar, non-representational stimuli (see Whittlesea & Price, 2001), 
and on the other hand, by using relatively short durations during the preference decision (e.g., 1 
second, Seamon et al., 1995; Willems, Adam, & Van der Linden, 2002; 3 seconds, Seamon, 
Kena, & Binder, 1998) or asking subjects to make their decisions fast.  
Moreover, the same attribution mechanisms as in recognition may also act in preference 
judgements. Indeed, as mentioned above, the mere exposure effect is often greater when stimuli 
are presented subliminally in the exposure phase than when they are presented supraliminally. 
Bornstein and D’Agostino (1992, 1994) suggested that, in the latter case, subjects undoubtedly 
realise that their performance may be affected by the previous exposure. Consequently, they 
discount the fluency of processing to some degree when making a preference decision. Along 
these lines, some authors have suggested that, once fluency experience is elicited by repetition or 
other manipulation, its impact on preference judgements could be moderated by attributional 
processes (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1994; Van den Bergh & Vrana, 1998), but also by the 
amount of fluency subjects expected (Butler, Berry, & Helman, 2004; Reber et al., 2004; 
Willems & Van der Linden, in press; Winkielman et al., 2003). In this vein, Willems and Van der 
Linden (in press) observed that manipulating the fluency of previously seen stimuli with an 
additional variation in picture clarity during the preference test influences the mere exposure 
effect. Indeed, the influence of pre-exposure was reduced when targets were presented with low 
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picture clarity and enhanced with high clarity. However, this influences preference only when the 
manipulation is imperceptible. When it is less subtle, the ease of processing resulting from 
picture quality seem be expected and consequently is perceived as uninformative. Moreover, the 
processing fluency was attributed totally to the picture quality manipulation and, accordingly, 
undermined the effect of enhanced fluency due to pre-exposure. To date, the importance of 
expectations has not been explored very much, but it definitely deserves more attention. In 
addition, earlier findings showed that, even when a feeling of fluency might be expected, some 
fluently processed stimuli may continue to elicit a preference, such as after an obvious 
supraliminal presentation phase, of the kind that has been used in some mere exposure paradigms 
(e.g., Seamon et al., 1995). Consequently, the nature of the connection between ease of 
processing and preference judgements and the importance of additional indirect factors seem to 
be complex and are worth studying.  
In sum, in light of this overview of the literature on the contribution of enhanced fluency 
to preference judgements and recognition decisions, we suggest that the degree to which fluency 
plays a role in preference and recognition depends on a number of similar conditions. These 
conditions may include, first, situations where cues other than fluency are unavailable or difficult 
to use and, second, situations where unexpected fluency captures the attention and thus is more 
likely to be used for recognition and preference judgements.  
From this perspective, in our first experiment, we investigated whether varying the 
amount of available information influenced participants’ reliance on fluency for preference 
responses, as it does for recognition responses. In order to examine this hypothesis, we varied the 
degree of material similarity by creating two material sets: less similar (S–) and highly similar 
(S+) unfamiliar faces. We compared the performance for unfamiliar S– and S+ faces in 
preference and recognition tasks. In order to measure the contributions of recollection and 
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familiarity, we applied the Remember/Know procedure to the recognition task. This procedure is 
an interesting method for measuring familiarity and the contribution of fluency. Indeed, prior 
research has shown that conceptual or perceptual fluency can mediate successful Know responses 
(e.g., Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000; Willems & Van der Linden, in press). For 
example, Rajaram (1993) found that masked primes reliably increased Know responses to both 
studied and non-studied test stimuli; that is, a preview of an old or new test item increased the 
probability that participants would know that the stimulus had been presented on the study list. 
Similarly, Willems and Van der Linden (2006) observed that an imperceptible manipulation of 
picture clarity at the test time seems have a direct impact on Know responses. Finally, we decided 
to explore the effect of test format on the heuristic choice. In fact, because the feeling of 
enhanced fluency is probably not absolute but relative (i.e., the fluency is only experienced in 
comparison to the relative difficulty of processing other items), it might be easier to assess small 
but reliable differences in fluency in the context of a forced-choice (2AFC) task than in a yes-no 
(YN) task.1 In summary, we expected that (1) the fluency resulting from previous exposure 
should be a more salient cue for the very similar set (stronger mere exposure effect and more 
Know responses in recognition); (2) a greater mere exposure effect and more correct Know 
responses would be evident in the forced-choice than in the yes-no test format. 
In Experiment 2, we added an unexpected fluency condition in order to test the 
discrepancy-attribution hypothesis (Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000, 2001a, b). Thus, we 
manipulated the subjects’ expectation of fluency by manipulating an additional fluency source at 
the test time (i.e., some pictures were presented with higher quality than other pictures). We 
hypothesised that perceptual fluency should be attributed to preference only if there is a 
discrepancy between expected fluency and actual fluency, in exactly the same way as for 
familiarity-based recognition. In other words, we anticipated obtaining a stronger preference 
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when participants did not expect to process pictures efficiently, i.e., when stimuli are presented 





Ninety-six undergraduate students from the University of Liège were volunteers in this 
experiment. There were 48 men and 48 women. Their mean age was 21.01 years old (SD = 1.72).  
Materials 
The stimuli were morphed faces. From an original set (an experimental database created at the 
University of Sheffield, UK) of 240 faces (male, front view, without any facial expression or 
distinguishing characteristics such as a beard, glasses or long hair, and with the same figure-
ground contrast), two sets of 60 morphed faces were created by morphing 120 pictures with one 
master picture in each set (see Fig. 1). Each morphed face was created by including a certain 
percentage of the shape and surface features of the master face. The degrees of similarity of the 
two sets were respectively 55% (S+, the 60 morphed faces shared 55% of the features of the 
master face: they were highly similar, see Fig. 1a) and 20% (S–, the 60 morphed faces shared 
20% of the features of the master face: they are less similar, see Fig. 1b). Because the morphing 
procedure can impair the quality of the picture, it was necessary to use morphed faces for the S– 
set, rather than pictures of unmorphed faces, in order to make the S– set as comparable as 
possible to the S+ set.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Each of the two sets was randomly divided into two subsets of 30 faces that could be used 
in the preference and recognition tests (with random counterbalancing between subjects). 
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Consequently, we had four subsets of 30 faces (Pref/S–, Rec/S–, Pref/S+, Rec/S+). Half of the 
subjects were presented with the two S– subsets (Pref/S– and Rec/S–) and the other half were 
presented with the two S+ subsets (Pref/S+ and Rec/S+).  
In addition, each of these four subsets was randomly divided into two lists of 15 stimuli (A 
and B). For half of the subjects, list A served as target stimuli and list B as distracters. The other 
half of the subjects were presented with the reverse design. 
All stimuli were presented on a 17" colour monitor running at 60 Hz, approximately 70 cm 
from the subject. The faces were about 9 cm high and 6 cm wide. They appeared on a black 
background, which yielded a pronounced figure-ground contrast. Each picture was made 
equivalent in file size (201 kB) and was presented using E-Prime software (Psychology Software 
Tools, Inc.). Low room illumination conditions were used throughout the experiment.  
Design and procedure 
The experimental set-up resulted in a three-factor design, with the first between-subject factor 
being the similarity condition (S+ versus S–). The second between-subject factor was the format 
of the task (yes-no versus forced-choice format). The third factor, which was manipulated within 
subjects, was the type of test (preference versus recognition). Therefore, there were four between-
subject conditions: two conditions involving only S+ faces (one using a YN test format and one 
using a 2AFC format) and two conditions with only S– faces (YN and 2AFC).  
Incidental study phase. Participants were told that the study involved ‘face perception’, and that 
they were going to see 30 faces, two times. After viewing three examples, they were asked to 
estimate the age of each of the 60 target faces presented by responding less than 30 years old or 
more than 30 years old. This task ensured that the subject remained focused throughout the 
presentation. No mention was made of any subsequent memory test. 
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Subjects were then presented with 30 faces, twice each, in two random series of 30. Each 
study stimulus was presented at the centre of the screen for 2,500 ms, followed by a 2,500-ms 
interval.  
Preference judgement. In the test phase of the YN preference judgement, subjects were presented 
with 30 faces, consisting of 15 previously shown faces randomly intermixed with 15 novel 
distracter faces. Each item was presented for 2 seconds, followed by a self-spaced interstimulus 
interval of approximately 1 to 2 seconds. Subjects were asked to examine each face and to decide 
whether the face is pleasant, yes or no. In the 2AFC preference judgement, 15 target-foil pairs 
were presented. Both faces were presented to the subject simultaneously. The side of the screen 
in which the target stimulus was displayed was counterbalanced and randomised over trials. 
Subjects were asked to examine each pair and to choose the face they liked best.  
Recognition judgement. In the test phase of the YN recognition task, participants saw a random 
list of 15 target faces and 15 distracter faces, which had not yet been used for the preference 
judgement. For each face, participants had to say whether they had seen it before. In the 2AFC 
recognition task, participants saw 15 target-distracter pairs and were asked to choose the stimulus 
that they had seen during the exposure phase.  
In addition, for both test formats, the subjects were asked to make a Remember-Know-
Guess response. Written instructions explaining Remember (R), Know (K), and Guess (G) 
responses were given to the participants (see Appendix). Participants entered their recognition 
responses on the computer keyboard and made the R-K-G judgements orally.  
The participants were tested individually. Half of the subjects were presented with the 
preference judgement first and then with the recognition judgement. The other half of the subjects 
performed the recognition judgement task before the preference judgement.  
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Results and discussion 
 
An α level of .05 was adopted for all inferential statistics, and their actual significance is 
reported whenever the level was below .10. 
As the order of the tasks had no effect on preference and recognition scores (Ps > .05), we 
did not consider this variable in the following analyses.  
Recognition performance. In order to compare 2AFC and YN tasks, we calculated d’ scores (see 
Table 1).2 The mean proportion of hits and false alarms on the YN tasks and the proportion of 
correct responses on the 2AFC tasks are presented in Table 1. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
An ANOVA with Similarity of the stimuli (S+ versus S–) and Format of the task (2AFC 
versus YN) as between-subject variables was conducted on these d’ scores. It revealed an 
advantage for the YN format (F(1, 92) = 16.56, MSe = 9.53, p < .001), and an advantage for less 
similar material (F(1, 92) = 4.67, MSe = 2.69, p = .03). Thus, as was logically to be expected, 
when we considered global recognition performance without distinguishing between the different 
recognition processes, we observed more correct recognition memory for the less similar material 
than for the very similar material.  
 
Remember, Know, and Guess. Separate ANOVAs with Format and Similarity as between-subject 
variables were performed for each response type (see Table 2). 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Regarding R responses for targets (hits), we observed only a main effect for similarity 
(F(1, 92) = 6.34, MSe = 0.14, p = .01), regardless of test format, showing that participants 
reported proportionally more R responses for S– than S+ stimuli. Analysis of R responses for 
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distracters (false alarms) also revealed that participants reported more R false alarms with the 
2AFC than the YN task format (F(1, 92) = 3.58, MSe = 0.01, p = .06); and with S+ than S– 
material (F(1, 92) = 9.59, MSe = 0.03, p = .002). This confirms that remembering is a more 
appropriate retrieval process for S– than S+ material and for the YN format than the 2AFC one. 
This effect of similarity can be explained in terms of the reduced distinctiveness of the material 
and of the increased interference. Indeed, increasing the average similarity of items increases 
overlap and interference (Norman, O’Reilly, & Huber, 2000), thus decreasing the distinctiveness 
(i.e., non-overlap) of memory traces. These results are therefore consistent with the very 
widespread idea that recollection-based recognition involves the retrieval of distinctive or 
qualitatively specific information about individual items (e.g., Hintzman & Curran, 1994; 
Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; Rajaram, 1996).  
For K responses, conversely, participants reported more correct responses for S+ material 
than S– items (F(1, 92) = 5.58, MSe = 0.07, p = .02), regardless of test format. Analysis of false 
responses showed that participants reported more K false alarms with the YN than the 2AFC 
format (F(1, 92) = 19.30, MSe = 0.10, p < .001), and for S+ material than S– items (F(1, 92) = 
3.04, MSe = 0.02, p = .08). Jacoby, Yonelinas, and Jennings (1997) have suggested that, if 
recollection and familiarity are independent processes that operate in parallel, the contribution of 
familiarity to recognition is understated by the proportion of K (familiar) responses. When 
familiarity for targets was measured by their Independence Remember/Know (IRK) procedure 
(Familiarity = K/ 1 – R), the analyses revealed no significant effect. For distracters, the analyses 
showed that distracters were more likely to be perceived as familiar in YN tasks than in 2AFC 
tasks (F(1, 92) = 18.37, MSe = 0.12, p < .001). A significant interaction (F(1, 92) = 3.87, MSe = 
0.02, p = .05) showed also that participants experienced significantly more familiarity for 
distracters with S+ than S– material in the YN condition (F(1, 92) = 6.15, p = .01), but not in the 
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2AFC task (F= 0.09). Globally, these findings thus indicate that the accuracy of familiarity was 
practically unaffected by the degree of similarity of the faces in 2AFC tasks. In the YN tasks, 
participants produced more familiarity responses for highly similar distracters than for less 
similar ones, but this was not the case in the 2AFC task. These findings are consistent with 
previous data showing that familiarity contributes more to correct recognition in forced-choice 
tasks than in yes-no recognition memory (Bastin & Van der Linden, 2003; Parkin, Yeomans, & 
Bindschaedler, 1994).3 In fact, increasing item similarity could make both studied items and 
distracters more fluent. Although similar distracters will also be fluent, they should be reliably 
less fluent than studied items. Thus, familiarity should greatly benefit from use of the 2AFC 
procedure, which allows subjects to tune into the small but reliable fluency differences that exist 
between these items.  
Finally, to consider the effect of test Format and Similarity on the heuristic (recollection 
versus familiarity-based recognition) adopted by the participants, global production scores (hits + 
false alarms) were calculated for each type of response. For the global production of R responses, 
we observed no significant effect, showing that the test format and similarity did not influence 
the total use of recovered details. Thus, surprisingly, recollection processes are here a retrieval 
mode used in all conditions, i.e. regardless of their efficiency. One explanation could be that the 
difficulty level was very great for both stimuli sets. Indeed, given this kind of complex unfamiliar 
stimulus coming from a single category (Caucasian young men) and with a completely uniform 
presentation format (i.e., all the stimuli were black-and-white photographs, in front view, the 
same size, without any contextual features, etc.), it should be quite difficult to discriminate one 
face from another. To respond to this evident difficulty, the participants could ‘by default’ 
attempt to find some critical feature in order to discriminate new from old stimuli (Whittlesea & 
Price, 2001). On the contrary, for the overall production of K responses, participants used more 
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familiarity-based responses for S+ material than S– items (F(1, 92) = 12.05, MSe = 0.18, p < 
.001). Thus, the perceptual similarity and the lack of distinctive features in the set of faces that 
shared 55% of their features seemed to encourage the participants to capitalise more on 
familiarity-based decisions. So although subjects used the recollection strategy as much in the 
less similar condition as in the highly similar condition (despite the fact that recollection seemed 
less accurate), a greater degree of similarity led people to rely more on a fluency strategy for the 
highly similar condition than for the less similar one.  
Finally, there was a main effect for Format on the false G responses (F(1, 92) = 46.86, 
MSe = 0.31, p < .001), indicating that there were more erroneous G responses in the 2AFC tasks 
than in the YN tasks. There was a main effect for Format on the global use of G responses (F(1, 
92) = 18.34, MSe = 0.26, p < .001), with subjects guessing more frequently in the forced-choice 
format. 
Mere exposure effect. In order to find out whether the mere exposure effect was present in the 
two test formats, we calculated the difference between liked targets and liked distracters and 
examined whether this difference was greater than zero.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
In the YN preference judgements, the mean difference between the proportion of liked 
targets and the proportion of liked distracters was .02 (SD = .29) for the S– set of stimuli and .07 
(SD = .2) for the S+ set. The difference was marginally greater than zero for S+ faces, with a 
medium effect (p = .06, d = .34), but not for S– ones for which effect sizes was small (p > .1, d = 
.06). In the 2AFC preference judgements, the mean difference between the proportion of liked 
targets and the proportion of liked distracters was .03 (SD = .21) for the S– set of stimuli and .275 
(SD = .35) for the S+ set. This difference was significant for S+ stimuli, with large effect (p < 
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.005, d = .81), but not for S– ones for which size effect was small (p > .1, d = 16). We expected 
that the mere exposure effect would be greater for highly similar stimuli than for less similar 
stimuli. Our results confirmed this prediction. This stronger preference effect could be explained 
by the fact that processing fluency resulting from previous exposure becomes more salient than 
the other available features that may possibly influence preference, such as facial shape and 
surface characteristics (e.g., symmetry, averageness, facial proportion, and skin texture).  
Nevertheless, the absence of the mere exposure effect for the less similar faces was 
unexpected. Indeed, one might wonder why we did not observe a preference effect for the less 
similar faces, while this effect was found for more heterogeneous unfamiliar faces (e.g., Willems, 
Adam, & Van der Linden, 2002). One important difference between the Willems et al. (2002) 
work and the current study is that in the former the stimuli were presented subliminally (17 ms), 
whereas the latter presented the stimuli supraliminally (2,500 ms). This difference is critical, as it 
is possible that subjects use different strategies to perform the preference task when they are 
aware that the stimuli have been presented before. More specifically, the failure to obtain a mere 
exposure effect for less similar faces in this experiment might be due to relatively good 
recollection (because of distinctiveness and encoding time), leading subjects to expect fluency as 
a result of obvious prior presentation and consequently not to rely on this fluency (see Bornstein 
& D’Agostino, 1992, 1994) and to turn to other inputs in order to formulate a preference 
judgement.  
As regards the highly similar condition, the difference between the fluency of processing 
of a target and the fluency of processing of its corresponding distracter was probably weaker than 
in the S– distracters. Indeed, the highly similar distracters include 55% of features that had 
already been seen and the less similar ones only 20%. In addition, some findings suggest that the 
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fluency-based preference induced by repeated exposure may generalise onto novel stimuli that 
are physically or structurally similar to those presented previously (e.g., Gordon & Holyoak, 
1983). Nevertheless, with recollection making a lesser contribution, one can imagine that this 
slight difference in fluency highlighted items which all looked the same to them. So a small but 
unexpected and surprising degree of fluency might influence the preference decision. In our 
second experiment, we further examined the influence of expectation.  
Finally, when one considers only the highly similar material (for which we observed a 
significant mere exposure effect), the d’ scores was marginally greater in the 2AFC task than in 
the YN task (t(46) = 1.773, p = .08). This confirms that the fluency driving the preference is, for 




Most previous studies of the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis have used linguistic stimuli 
(words and non-words). In our second experiment, we explored the question of whether the 
perception of discrepancy is a heuristic that can be used for familiarity-based recognition of 
another type of stimulus: unfamiliar faces. We also investigated whether the perception of 
discrepancy could be attributed to preference. We addressed this issue by manipulating the 
subjects’ expectation of fluency through variations in the quality of the target pictures (figure-
ground contrast, luminosity, and posterisation). Some studies have demonstrated that increased 
picture quality leads to a linear increase in processing fluency (see Checkosky & Whitlock, 1973; 
Reber et al., 1998; Willems & Van der Linden, in press). Given such results, we assume that a 
perceptible decrease in processing fluency for some targets based on picture quality will lead 
subjects to expect a higher level of fluency for clear targets than for blurry targets. Further, we 
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assume that repeated previous exposure will increase the fluency of target pictures to a level 
superior to the level that would be expected from poor-quality targets at the test phase but not 
from clear targets. This unexpected fluency could capture a subject’s attention and might be used 
in the preference task or the recognition task.  
In this experiment, we used the forced-choice format (which ensured that we observed a 
greater preference effect and more correct K responses) with less similar faces (with which we 




Twenty young adults were volunteers in this experiment. There were 10 men and 10 women. 
Most of them were undergraduate students from the University of Liège, Belgium. Their mean 
age was 21.9 years old (SD = 1.31).  
 
Materials and procedure 
The face set was the less similar set of faces from experiment 1. The experimental details were 
the same, with two exceptions: first, we used only the forced-choice format. Second, we 
introduced the clarity condition as a within-subject condition. Each picture underwent a 10% 
contrast and luminosity reduction and slight posterisation (increasing the pixel size and 
decreasing the clarity). These picture modifications were very subtle; thus, the decrease in quality 
could be perceived without necessarily being noticed (see Fig. 2).  
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Face targets were randomly divided into two sets (A, B). Half of the subjects were 
presented with set A as the clear stimuli and set B as the blurred stimuli. The other half of the 
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subjects were presented with the reverse design. Thus, each target was presented clear for half of 
the subjects and blurred for the other half. 
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
The proportions of correct responses for preference and recognition as a function of picture 
clarity are presented in Table 4.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Since the order of the tasks had no effect on preference and recognition scores (Ps > .05), 
we did not consider this variable in the following analyses. 
Recognition performance. When considering the proportion of correct recognition responses, the 
recognition performance was identical for both clarity conditions (p = .58).  
Remember, Know, and Guess. Separate ANOVAs with Clarity and Type of response as within-
subject variables were performed for hits and false alarms (see Table 5).  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
For hit responses, we observed a main effect for Type of response (F(2, 38) = 30.23, MSe 
= .79, p < .001), with more R responses than K responses or G responses (p < .01), a Type of 
response × Clarity interaction (F(2, 38) = 3.75, MSe = .07, p = .03), but no effect for Clarity (p > 
.1). Planned comparisons showed no significant effect for R and G responses, but more correct K 
responses for blurred pictures than clear ones (F(1, 19) = 7.92, p =.01). When familiarity for 
targets was measured by the IRK procedure (Familiarity = K/ 1 – R, Jacoby et al., 1997), the 
analyses revealed a marginal difference for blurred and clear faces (t(19) = 1.66, p =.06). For 
false alarms, we observed no significant effects (ps >.05). Thus, we found that clarity did have an 
effect on performance, but only for familiarity. These data seem to indicate that familiarity-based 
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recognition of old items is more accurate when fluent processing occurs in an unexpected 
condition. Indeed, in the case of blurred targets, the actual fluency probably diverged from the 
expected fluency for the poorer-quality pictures. This deterioration in the quality of target 
pictures might prompt participants to engage in an attributional process to explain their feeling of 
fluency. Since that feeling is not attributable to the test context (poor picture quality), participants 
explained it as resulting from another source such as a prior encounter in the context of 
recognition tasks.  
Mere exposure effect. The mean proportions of target faces chosen in the preference judgement 
were .54 (SD = .18) for clear faces and .65 (SD = .15) for blurred faces. Subjects selected blurred 
targets in a proportion greater than chance, with large effect (estimated at .50, p < .001, d = 1) but 
this was not the case with clear targets, (p > .05, d = .19). Thus, again we did not observe an 
effect of repetition on preference responses for less similar material. However, when these same 
faces were presented with poorer picture quality, we noted a mere exposure effect. In other 
words, stimuli that are experienced as not being particularly well liked when presented in the 
clear condition (as in experiment 1), are experienced as well liked when presented in the blurred 
condition. Moreover, contrary to Experiment 1, we observed no condition effect on recollection. 
Thus, the success in obtaining a mere exposure effect for blurred faces might not be due to a less 
efficient recollection of these faces. Our findings therefore appear consistent with the account of 
the feeling of familiarity proposed by Whittlesea and Williams (1998) since the less fluent the 
stimulus was expected to be, the more it evoked a familiarity and preference response.  
In summary, it seems that the discrepancy-attribution effect is a phenomenon that can be 
generalised to the feeling of familiarity measured by participants’ subjective reports and to 
unfamiliar visual stimuli. Moreover, our results indicate that discrepancy attribution can also be 
extended to the mere exposure effect.  
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Conclusion 
In two experiments, the influence of processing fluency due to pre-exposure on preference and 
recognition judgements was found to depend on relatively similar variables: the amount of 
information in the stimuli, the format of the test, and the picture quality of the target stimuli in the 
test phase.  
In Experiment 1, the influence of processing fluency due to pre-exposure on recognition, 
and more particularly on preference judgement, was found to depend on the amount of distinctive 
information. In fact, as regards preference, processing resulting from repeated exposure 
influenced participants’ preference decisions about very similar faces but not about distinctive 
faces. We suggested that several factors might explain these data. First, as with recognition, 
where fluency plays a dominant role only if conscious recollection fails to yield reliable 
memories (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1989), and if fluency is seen as a relevant source (e.g., Westerman,, 
Lloyd, & Miller, 2002), a fluency heuristic is probably not a ‘by default heuristic’ for preference 
responses. Rather, in spite of the strong links between fluency and positive affect (Harmon-Jones 
& Allen, 2001; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001), the impact of stimulus content itself (semantic 
content or objective critical perceptual features) certainly override the vague perception of 
processing quality quite often. Further, it is probable that the objective processing fluency (i.e., 
high or low speed, resource demands, accuracy of mental processes) that qualifies every 
cognitive act is a dimension that most often goes unnoticed and that does not lead to an 
experience of subjective fluency and consequently to a conscious subjective feeling of 
preference. Second, we suggested that, given that distinctive material was recollected more 
efficiently than similar material, participants might therefore be more aware of the impact of prior 
presentation and expect to feel more fluency for this distinctive material. In this case, fluency 
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might be judged irrelevant for preference judgements (because it is attributed to repetition). 
Subjects would then turn to other available inputs to arrive at their preference judgements. This 
hypothesis concerning the role of expectation seems to be supported by the findings of 
Experiment 2. Indeed, although repetition did not influence preference judgements for distinctive 
material in Experiment 1, it did enhance preference when the picture quality for this material was 
lower, in Experiment 2. Thus, in spite of the efficient recollection of distinctive material, variable 
picture quality at test seems to lead participants to weight their expectations due to their 
awareness of prior repetition. Participants might expect to experience very little fluency for 
poorer-quality pictures and be taken by surprise at how fluently they could process these pictures; 
consequently, they might allocate a part of this fluency to preference, due to the surprisingly 
fluent processing of pictures that were poorer in quality but had been previously encountered.  
As mentioned above, these factors have been extensively investigated in the context of 
recognition, but not with other judgemental tasks (such as preference, truth, fame, perceptual 
characteristics, frequency estimates, feelings of knowing, stimulus duration, etc). Nevertheless, in 
light of this study, it is probable that the degree to which fluency plays a role in these kinds of 
judgement could depend on relatively similar conditions such as amount of available cues other 
than fluency and expectations. However, there may be some exceptions. For example, Reber et 
al. (Reber, Zimmermann, & Wurtz, 2004) showed that potential expectations about the 
processing quality of different stimuli (words, regular non-words, and irregular non-words) did 
not moderate the effects of fluency on duration judgements. These authors suggested that, during 
a recognition task, participants do not necessarily assess the experienced fluency immediately and 
do not infer familiarity directly from experienced fluency. On the contrary, participants may 
simply and directly transform experienced fluency into a duration evaluation, regardless of the 
actual source of the fluency. If this assumption is right, it will be a challenge for future research 
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to discover in which kinds of judgement tasks people do not base their judgement on a direct 
assessment of processing fluency (such as recognition and preference) and in which kinds of 
tasks people assess fluency immediately and base their responses directly on experienced fluency 
(such as duration).  
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Table 1. Recognition as a function of test format and faces’ similarity 
 Highly similar material Less similar material 
Format Hits/Proportion 
correct 
False alarms d’ Hits/Proportion 
correct 
False alarms d’ 
2AFC 
recognition 
.68 (.10)  .77 (.46) .71 (.07)  .93 (.34) 
YN recognition .65 (.18) .26 (.11) 1.34 (1.02) .67 (.18) .175 (.09) 1.62 (.95) 
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Table 2. Proportion of Remember-Know-Guess responses for targets and distracters as a function 
of test format and faces’ similarity 
 
 Highly similar material Less similar material 
Task Targets Distracters Targets Distracters 
2AFC 
Remember .28 (.13) .11 (.07) .39 (.11) .07 (.08) 
Know .30 (.14) .05 (.04) .23 (.09) .04 (.04) 
Guess .09 (.08) .16 (.11) .09 (.07) .18 (.08) 
YN 
Remember .32 (.17) .08 (.04) .37 (.14) .05 (.03) 
Know .24 (.09) .13 (.11) .21 (.12) .09 (.08) 
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Table 3. Preference as a function of test format and faces’ similarity 
 
 Highly similar material Less similar material 
Format Hits/Proportion 
correct 
False alarms d’ Hits/Proportion 
correct 
False alarms d’ 
2AFC  .64 (.17) - .51 (.78) .52 (.11) - .15 (.40) 
YN  .37 (.13) .30 (.13) .22 (.60) .39 (.14) .38 (.27) .34 (1.35) 
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Table 4. Preference and recognition as a function  
of picture clarity. 
 
 Clear Pictures Blurred Pictures 
Preference .54 (.18) .65 (.15) 
Recogniti
on 
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Table 5. Proportions of Remember-Know-Guess responses for targets as a function  
of the fluency expectation 
 Clear target Blurred target 
 Target Distracter Target Distracter 
Remember .38 (.22) .10 (.16) .38 (.11) .11 (.09) 
Know .17 (.12) .12 (.12) .27 (.13) .08 (.09) 
Guess .13 (.11) .11 (.15) .07 (.09) .11 (.09) 
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FIGURE TITLES  
Figure 1a. Examples of S+ faces (55% of the features of a master face). 
Figure 1b. Examples of S– faces (20% of the features of a master face). 
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Figure 1b. 
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Figure 2.  
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APPENDIX 
Remember–Know–Guess Instructions for the Yes-No Task (variations in the instructions for the 
Forced-Choice Task are presented in parentheses). 
 
Remember 
Often, when you recognise a face, you remember that you have seen it before and you remember 
the precise context you have seen it in. You may also remember an event, a feeling or a thought 
that occurred when you first saw this face. For example, when you saw that face for the first time, 
you found that he looked like your cousin or you noticed a particular feature. So we ask you to 
classify as ‘remember’ a ‘yes’ response (a response) for which you can retrieve information about 
the encoding context. An example in everyday life would be the following: you are walking in 
the street and you meet a person whom you recognise because you remember having seen 
him/her at your sister’s wedding, or because you remember having seen him/her in the bus last 
week. 
Know 
We ask you to classify a ‘yes’ response (a response) as ‘know’ if you do not remember any 
information associated with the face. You are sure that you have seen it before because you have 
a strong feeling of familiarity, but you do not remember any information encoded with the face, 
such as when you saw it or any element that you might have noticed. In everyday life, such a 
‘know’ situation could be: walking in the street and meeting somebody you recognise. You know 
that you have seen him/her before, but you cannot remember who this person is or where and 
when you first saw him/her. The only thing you know is that this person seems familiar. 
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Guess 
It is also possible that you may not remember any information encoded with the face and that you 
are not sure whether it is familiar. However, you are not certain that you have not seen it before 
either. In such a case, you can ‘guess’. 
(You can guess if you do not remember any of the faces. If none of the faces seem familiar or if 
you do not remember any information about the learning context for any of them, you cannot 
respond that you ‘remember’ or ‘know’. Because you still have to choose one face, you can 
guess.) 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1
 In addition, there is a phenomenon known as the ‘test-pair similarity effect’, which shows that 
YN recognition accuracy decreases with increasing target/lure similarity, but 2AFC recognition 
accuracy is not affected or increases slightly with similarity (e.g., Hintzman, 2001; Norman & 
O’Reilly, 2003). This pattern can be explained by data showing that familiarity contributes more 
to correct recognition in 2AFC than in YN tasks (Bastin & Van der Linden, 2003; Parkin, 
Yeomans, & Bindschaedler, 1994) and by data showing that familiarity is less strongly affected 
by target/lure similarity than recollection is (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003).  
 
2
 For YN tasks, the d’ values were obtained from hits (liked target) and false alarms (liked 
distracter), and for the 2AFC tasks, they were computed from the proportion of correct responses 
by means of a corrected formula (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). 
3
 In addition, these findings provide evidence for the ‘test-pair similarity effect’, which shows 
that YN recognition accuracy decreases with increasing target/lure similarity, whereas 2AFC 
accuracy increases slightly or is not affected by similarity (e.g., Hintzman, 2001; Norman & 
O’Reilly, 2003). 
